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1. Introduction 
One of the aims of banking supervision is to early detect bank financial distress in order to 
avoid failure or to limit its cost. Supervisory risk assessment is mainly based on two procedures: 
off-site and on-site examinations. During on-site examinations, supervisors make an overall 
assessment of a banking institution in-situ which allows obtaining private information. They can 
check that the accounts of a bank provide a true and fair view of the bank's financial condition. This 
assessment is based on quantitative factors such as accounting data and on qualitative ones like 
management capabilities and internal control procedures. It leads to the assignment of supervisory 
ratings (like CAMELS
1
) and, if necessary, to the implementation of prompt corrective actions. 
However, supervisory resources are limited and on-site exams, which are the most efficient exams, 
are very costly. Thus, they are led only once a year except if problems are detected (Cole and 
Gunther, 1998). Between two on-site exams, supervisors lead off-site exams which rely exclusively 
on accounting data provided by banks on a quarterly basis. They enable supervisors to detect risky 
banks from quantitative data and to decide whether an early on-site exam must be conducted. 
However, accounting data are available only on an annual or quarterly basis and, between two on-
site exams, their information content can decay fairly quickly (Gunther and Moore, 2003). Berger, 
Davies and Flannery [2000] show that the assessments of banks’ financial conditions by supervisors 
are less accurate than the market ones except if supervisory assessments follow immediately an on-
site exam ; in this case supervisory assessment is more accurate because they gain access to private 
information but it gets "stale" quite quickly. Between two on-site exams, the use of market 
information may improve supervisory risk assesment. 
Indeed, market discipline can be exerted by market participants if they have sufficient 
information and if they have the incentives and ability to assess bank risk. BGFRS
2
 [1999] 
distinguishes two components in market discipline: direct and indirect market discipline. Direct 
market discipline means that market participants can directly influence banks’ behaviour: uninsured 
debtholders are at risk and as they bear losses in case of bank failure they require a rate of return 
which increases with the risk they perceive. If they correctly assess banks’ risk, the raise of the 
funding cost following an increase in risk should restrain banks’ excessive risk taking. Indirect 
market discipline generates a signal about banks’ risk which can be used by supervisors into 
banking supervision in order to better allocate supervisory ressources. 
                                                 
1
 Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity. 
2
 Board Of Governors Of The Federal Reserve System (BGFRS) 
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In the field of market discipline, a large part is dedicated to mandatory subordinated debt 
proposals. Several researchers suggest that banks should hold a portion of their liabilities into 
subordinated debt (see BGFRS, 1999 and Evanoff and Wall, 2000). Indeed, subordinated debt 
holders and supervisors are both concerned about bank risk. If a bank fails and if its assets value is 
less than its liabilities, depositors and senior debtholders are compensated first. Then, subordinated 
debt holders, who are junior claimholders, share the residual value. If a bank is at risk, subordinated 
debt holders bear a considerable risk because of their junior status. The aim of subordinated debt 
proposals is to enhance both direct and indirect market discipline: direct market discipline is 
exercised via the funding cost of banks which depends on bank risk, and indirect market discipline 
is possible if supervisors use subordinated debt rate of return as a signal about bank risk. Thus, 
market discipline may improve the efficiency of banking supervision and decrease its cost. 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine how, between two on-site exams, mandatory 
subordinated debt can affect banks’ behaviour and the effectiveness of banking supervision. To do 
so, we analyse the direct influence of subordinated debt on bank risk via funding cost. An indirect 
influence is also taken into account, supposing that supervisors use subordinated debt rate of return 
as a signal about bank risk. Indeed, between two on-site exams, supervisors watch banks and if a 
bank is viewed as particularly risky, they may decide to inspect it earlier and to implement 
corrective actions. As supervisors can not perfectly assess bank risk, the use of market assessment 
may allow a better allocation of supervisory ressources. However, the behaviour of subordinated 
debt holders is affected by the information they hold, their ability to use it and their perception of a 
possible bail out in case of bank failure. Thus, we consider several cases depending on the ability 
and incentives of subordinated debt holders to assess bank risk. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework of the model; 
we explain banks’ excessive risk taking incentives and how we take into account banking 
supervision. In section 3, we introduce market discipline by requiring banks to hold a certain 
portion of their liabilities in subordinated debt. We analyse the effects depending on the ability and 
incentives of subordinated debt holders to exercise a dicipline. Two cases are considered: i) 
subordinated debt holders can not perfectly assess bank risk;  ii) the perception of a possible bail out 
in case of bank failure affects their incentives to restrain banks’ excessive risk taking. Finally, 
section 4 concludes. 
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2. General framework 
We consider a one-period model. A risk neutral bank is funded by debt. To simplify, we 
consider that there is no equity
3
. Total assets are normalized to 1. The bank invests in a porfolio 
with a two-point distribution of the rate of return as in Gropp et Vesala [2004]: 
 
R = RH with probability (1 ) mρ ρ− +  
R = RL = 0 with probability (1 )mρ −  
 
ρ is the probability of default in the absence of monitoring ( ρ ∈ [0,1]) and m represents the bank’s 
choice of monitoring effort (m∈  [0,1]). Monitoring increases the probability that RH is obtained but 
it is costly. We assume a strictly positive and convex monitoring cost schedule C(m) (C'(m) >0, 
C"(m)>0 et C(0) = 0). 
The probability of default depends on an exogenous parameter ρ  and on the monitoring effort of 
the bank. If the bank chooses an effort of monitoring equal to 1, it receives the rate of return RH 
with certainty. If R=0, the bank cannot pay off its debt and fails. Thus, the probability of default 
is (1 )mρ − . Bank risk, taken into account via the probability of default, depends on two 
components: i) the effort of monitoring chosen, m, non observable; ii) the probability of default in 
absence of monitoring, ρ, which can be interpreted as the observable part of the bank’s asset risk. 
As ρ is exogenous, when the bank chooses its level of monitoring m it also determines its risk of 
default. Thus, we will consider that an increase in monitoring is identical to a decrease in bank risk 
of default. 
 
First, we consider that debt is fully insured. Its amount is normalized to 1. We assume that 
the insurance premium cannot be made contingent on bank risk and for simplicity it is set equal to 
                                                 
3
 Our aim is to study the link between banking supervision and market discipline (pillars 2 and 3 of Basel II) taking into 
account the conditions of effectiveness of market discipline. To simplify, we do not consider equity even if we are 
aware of the link between equity and subordinated debt via, for example, the capital constraint. Besides, the 
subordinated debt rate of return should depend on the capital cushion held by the bank, which influences its default 
probability. Here, this rate of return depends on the probability of failure but it is independent of the capital, which is 
normalized to 0, and depends solely on the choice of monitoring and on an exogenous parameter. This is taken into 
account, in this model, by a two-point distribution of the rate of return.  
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zero. Depositors are fully insured, and they earn the risk free rate (Rf ) on their deposits even if the 
bank fails. 
 
2.1. First best 
From a social perspective, the level of monitoring chosen by the bank should be such that it 
maximizes the expected return of bank’s assets, net of the monitoring cost and of the cost of debt 
taken into account whether the bank fails or not. Thus, the expected value VS is maximized: 
 
(1) [ ]max (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )H f f
m
VS m R R m R C mρ ρ ρ= − + − − − −   
 
VS is maximized when: 
         
(2) 'H mR Cρ =              
 
The expected cost of debt
4
 does not depend on the level of monitoring, m, and is equal to Rf. 
Equation (2) indicates that, at the equilibrium, the marginal return of monitoring is equal to its 
marginal cost. The marginal return corresponds to the increase in the non default probability, due to 
the increase in monitoring, multiplied by bank’s earnings in the non default state. We note m
S
 the 
level of monitoring corresponding to this situation. 
 
2.2. Bank’s excessive risk taking 
We now consider the maximization problem from an individual bank point of view. We will 
show that the bank takes too much risk that is chooses a level of monitoring less than the socially 
optimal one. 
As the bank has limited liabilities, it does not have to pay off depositors in case of default. 
Therefore the bank only considers the non default state into its optimization problem and it chooses 
the level of monitoring such as to maximize its expected value: 
                                                 
4
 [ ](1 ) (1 )f f fm R m R Rρ ρ ρ− + + − =  
 6 
 
(3) [ ]max (1 ) ( ) (1 )(0) ( )H f
m
V m R R m C mρ ρ ρ= − + − + − −                   
 
The problem can be rewritten: 
 
(4) [ ]max (1 ) (1 ) ( )H f f
m
V m R R m R C mρ ρ ρ= − + − + − −                       
 
The term (1 ) fm Rρ − represents the amount the bank does not have to pay in case of default because 
of its limited liabilities. Besides, as deposits are fully insured, depositors know that they will be 
refunded even if the bank fails and therefore they are not penalized if the bank takes excessive risk. 
The rate of return on deposits is independent of bank’s risk of default. Thus, the expected cost of 
debt, which is the cost of debt times the non default probability ([ ](1 ) fm Rρ ρ− + ), is an increasing 
function of the level of monitoring chosen by the bank (it decreases with its default risk). 
 
The expected value of the bank is maximized when: 
 
(5) '( )H f mR R Cρ − =                                                                   
 
An increase in monitoring raises the probability for the bank to pay the cost of the debt. Thus, the 
return of monitoring is less than the one previously obtained. As we assume a strictly positive and 
convex monitoring cost schedule, we can conclude that the level of monitoring chosen by the bank 
(m
B
) is less than the socially optimal one (m
S
). 
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Figure 1: the socially optimal level of monitoring (mS) and the level of monitoring chosen by 
the bank (mB) 
 
If the debt is fully insured, the bank chooses an excessive level of risk (i.e. a low level of 
monitoring) because the expected cost of its liabilities ((1-ρ +mρ)Rf) is a decreasing function of 
default risk (increasing function of monitoring).  
From a social point of view, the level of monitoring should be higher because the cost of 
liabilities in case of default has to be taken into account in the optimization problem. This excessive 
risk, due to the fact that insured deposit cost is independent of risk, has been emphasized in several 
models (Blum [2002] and Levonian [2001]). 
 
2.3. Banking supervision 
We now introduce supervision. In this model, supervisors aim to control the risk taken by 
the bank. 
 Park [1997] considers, in his model, the impact of supervision on bank’s behaviour when 
supervisors have limited resources and thus cannot closely monitor each bank. Supervisors use the 
information available (the level of capitalization and the proportion of the bank’s assets invested in 
the risky project) to classify banks into two groups: safe and risky. Regulators order corrective 
Rm(m) 
Cm(m) 
Monitoring 
'
mC
ρ(RH – Rf) 
ρRH 
      m
B      
        m
S 
 8 
actions and closely supervise risky banks. Thus, banks cannot have a positive option value
5
 and 
they take it into account in their optimization problem. Choice variables in Park [1997]  , which are 
the level of capitalization and the proportion of the bank’s assets invested in the risky project, are 
affected by the fact that supervisors use them explicitly to decide the implementation of corrective 
actions. Unlike the case without regulation, banks do not choose to take the maximum risk. 
 
 Here, we suppose that supervisors classify, between two on-site exams, banks into two 
groups depending on their estimated risk of default. They decide to early inspect a bank if its 
probability of default is greater than a threshold they fixed. However, between two on-site exams, 
the risk of the bank is not fully observable. To assess it, supervisors use statistical models relying on 
accounting information
6
 which is essentially backward looking. Thus it does not reflect perfectly 
the current situation of the bank. Besides, these statistical models are rigid and they cannot be 
adjusted as frequently as necessary. Therefore, supervisors assess imperfectly the risk taken by the 
bank. To take into account this imperfection, we suppose that supervisors know the observable 
assets risk, ρ , but not the level of monitoring chosen by the bank. As a consequence, supervisory 
resources are not optimally allocated because of classification errors, which imply that particularly 
risky banks may not be inspected whereas safe banks may be subjected to inspection. At the bank 
level, the probability of being inspected does not depend on the true level of monitoring but on the 
level assessed by supervisors. However, we suppose that after an inspection, supervisors are fully 
informed about the situation of the bank and they can impose corrective actions such as to limit the 
risk taken by the bank. These measures depend on the situation of the bank: only few changes are 
required if the financial situation of the bank is correct but supervisors are all the more demanding 
than the situation of the bank is damaged.  
Corrective actions implemented after an on-site exam can be recommendations on decisions 
to take to improve the quality of management or the financial situation, or some restrictions into 
                                                 
5
 This option value is due to the limited liabilities of the bank. It is the failure probability times the expected deficiency 
of assets (liability – assets) when the bank fails. 
6
 These models are used to anticipate financial distress (prediction of bank failures or downgradings) and correspond for 
example to the American systems SEER (System for Estimating Examination Ratings) and SCOR (Statistical CAMELS 
Offsite Rating) or to the French system SAABA (Support System for Banking Analysis). Recently, some systems have 
included market information in addition to accounting information. The central bank of Sweden uses equity market 
information via indicators such as the variation of the “distance to default” or the EDF (Expected Default Frequency) 
(Persson et Blavarg, 2003). 
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banks’ activities. Supervisors can also enforce sanctions in the form of financial fines, official 
warnings or in extreme cases accreditation withdraws.  
Here, to take into account the consequences of these measures on the behaviour of the bank, 
corrective actions are modelized as a cost CC borne by the bank, as soon as it is inspected. This cost 
is defined such that it eliminates excessive risk taking incentives from a social point of view: if a 
bank is inspected it chooses the optimal level of monitoring. Thus, the expected cost of liabilities 
and corrective actions is independent of risk: 
 
(6) [ ](1 ) f fm R CC Rρ ρ− + + =  
 
That is: 
 
(7) (1 ) fCC m Rρ= −  
 
The cost of corrective actions borne by an inspected bank is a decreasing function of the level of 
monitoring exerted by the bank. It is a function of the level of monitoring because it is determined 
after the inspection when supervisors have all the information necessary to correctly assess the risk 
of the bank. Thus, the existence of these measures encourages the bank to restrict its risk. 
 
The bank maximizes its expected value taking into account the possibility of being inspected and of 
bearing corrective actions: 
 
(8) [ ]max (1 ) ( ) ( )H f
m
V m R R qCC C mρ ρ= − + − − −  
with (1 ) fCC m Rρ= −  
 
with q the inspection probability which is independent of the true level of monitoring as it is 
unknown before the inspection. 
 
Incorporating CC into the objective function, the problem of the bank is: 
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(9) [ ]max (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )H f f
m
V m R R q m R C mρ ρ ρ= − + − + − − −                                         
 
The term (1 ) fm Rρ −  corresponds to the saving made by the bank on its payment to depositors in 
case it defaults because of its limited liabilities. However, this saving is possible only if the bank is 
not inspected that is with a probability 1-q. 
 
The expected value of the bank is maximized when: 
 
(10) '( (1 ) )H f mR q R Cρ − − =                                                        
 
Thus, the probability of being inspected encourages the bank to choose a level of monitoring (m
INSP
) 
greater than the one chosen without supervision (m
B
) because the expected saving on the cost of 
liabilities in case of default, which encourages to reduce monitoring, exists only if the bank is not 
inspected. If all banks were inspected with certainty (q=1), the optimal level of monitoring from a 
social point of view (m
S
) would be reached. However, as supervisors have only limited resources, 
they do not inspect all banks and, as they have only imperfect information about banks’ risk, they 
cannot discriminate between banks to inspect according to their risk. 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
   
Figure 2: socially optimal level of monitoring (mS), level of monitoring chosen by the bank 
in absence of banking supervision (mB) and level of monitoring chosen by the bank 
subjected to banking supervision (mINSP) 
 
Rm(m) 
Cm(m) 
m 
'
mC  
ρ(RH – Rf) 
ρRH 
      m
B   
m
INSP 
  m
S 
ρ(RH –(1-q)Rf) 
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Between two on-site exams, supervision allows a reduction in bank’s excessive risk. 
However, as supervisors have only imperfect information about the risk of default of the bank, the 
allocation of supervisory resources is not optimal and the probability of an inspection is 
independent of the actual monitoring. 
In order to improve excessive risk taking limitation, the use of market discipline can be 
considered via, for example, mandatory subordinated debt which implies that banks have to hold a 
certain portion of their liabilities into subordinated debt. The effectiveness of bank supervision may 
be improved thanks to direct and indirect market discipline induced by these liabilities. Indeed, as 
their rate of return depends on bank’s risk of default, it should affect bank’s behaviour and could be 
used by supervisors as a signal about bank’s risk
7
. The improvement of the effectiveness of bank 
supervision is possible if the market can assess bank’s situation and help identifying or controlling 
its risk exposure. Indeed, if supervisors benefit from private information thanks to on-site exams, 
this information is updated at a low frequency in contrast to market information which is available 
on a daily basis. Besides, because banks’ financial assessment models on which rely supervisors are 
rigid, they cannot adjust continuously in contrast to market information. Requiring banks to hold a 
certain portion of their liabilities into subordinated debt may allow a better control of bank risk. 
However, depending on the ability and incentives of subordinated debt holders to exercise market 
discipline, bank’s risk taking and the effectiveness of bank supervision can be modified quite 
differently. 
 
3. Market discipline: a complement to banking supervision 
 
 Until this section, we have considered a bank fully funded with deposits. Depositors are 
fully insured and thus indifferent to the default risk of the bank. Yet, other actors can exist: 
subordinated debt holders. They are concerned about bank’s risk of default because, as they are not 
insured, they are not compensated in case of the bank defaults. 
Now the bank has to hold a portion, u [ ]0,1∈ , of their liabilities into subordinated debt. 
Bank’s liabilities are subdivided into two parts: insured deposits in proportion (1-u) and 
subordinated debt in proportion u with u exogenous. 
                                                 
7
 See BGFRS [1999]. 
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Bank’s behaviour is affected by the presence of subordinated debt because market discipline 
can be exerted by its holders. This discipline is exerted via two channels: a direct channel, which 
corresponds to the direct influence of the market on bank’s behaviour, and an indirect channel 
corresponding to the fact that supervisors use the assessment of bank’s risk made by the market. 
 
Blum [2002] shows that the level of risk chosen by the bank corresponds to the socially 
optimal one if subordinated debt holders can perfectly observe bank’s risk, if debt is fully 
uninsured, if there is no bankruptcy cost borne by the bank and if the bank can commit to a level of 
risk. When only a portion of debt is uninsured, the presence of resources with a cost depending on 
bank’s risk enables to get closer to the socially optimal solution. We find the same result in this 
model (see appendix). 
 
However, on top of this direct market discipline considered in Blum [2002], we take into 
account an indirect market discipline: supervisors use market information to assess bank’s risk of 
default and to decide to lead early on-site inspections. This indirect market discipline is pertinent, 
even if subordinated debt holders are fully informed about bank’s risk, once a portion of debt is 
insured because bank’s risk remains greater than the socially optimal level. Indeed, as underlined by 
Levonian [2001], "the subordinated debt market does "punish" shareholders for shifting risk to debt 
holders, which is the essence of market discipline. But because subordinated debt is just that – 
subordinate, and therefore junior to deposits – the subordinated debt holders in effect "give credit" 
to shareholders for the portion of risk shifted past them to the senior claimant (or any deposit 
guarantor)". Market discipline is exerted only for the portion of debt which is uninsured. Once a 
portion of debt is insured, the bank has incentives to take excessive risk. 
We also consider the conditions of effectiveness of market discipline. Indeed, it is likely that 
the assessment of bank’s risk by subordinated debt holders is not perfect. And, market discipline is 
effective only if debt holders have the abilities and incentives to exercise it. The ability of market 
participants to assess bank’s risk depends on the information they hold and on their ability to 
analyze it, their incentives depend on the credibility of non bail out in case of bank’s default. Thus, 
we consider the consequences of mandatory subordinated debt in different contexts. We first 
consider that subordinated debt holders cannot perfectly assess bank’s risk. Then, we consider that 
subordinated debt holders can perfectly assess bank’s risk but perceive the possibility of a bail out 
in case of bank’s default.  
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3.1. Imperfect assessment of bank’s risk by subordinated debt 
holders 
We suppose that subordinated debt holders assess only imperfectly the risk of the bank. 
With a probability α ∈[0; 1]
8
, they correctly assess the level of monitoring of the bank and they 
adjust the rate of return they ask for. With probability (1-α), they cannot correctly assess 
monitoring. The parameter α reflects the information held by the market and its ability and rapidity 
to analyze it, to extract actual risk from it and to incorporate it into the rate of return they require. If 
α=0, subordinated debt holders cannot assess actual monitoring and there is no market discipline. If 
α=1, market discipline is perfect, the rate of return required by subordinated debt holders perfectly 
reflects bank’s risk of default. Between these two extremes, subordinated debt holders can partially 
assess actual monitoring and the rapidity and effectiveness with which they incorporate it into the 
rate of return they ask for are represented by the parameter α. 
We suppose that subordinated debt holders accept an expected rate of return equal to the risk free 
rate of return
9
. 
If α = 1, they perfectly assess actual monitoring and the rate of return of subordinated debt is: 
 
(11) [ ](1 )
fI
u
m
R
R
ρ ρ− +
=  
  
If α = 0, they cannot correctly estimate the level of monitoring chosen by the bank. The rate of 
return of subordinated debt is independent of m but depends on the observable risk (ρ) and on an 
average level of monitoring, mɶ , depending on past information about the whole banking sector : 
 
(12) [ ](1 )
fNI
u
R
R
mρ ρ
=
− + ɶ
 
 
                                                 
8
 This notion of partial observability is used by Boot and Schmeits [2000]. They study the potential benefits of 
conglomerate depending on market discipline. 
9
 This hypothesis used by Calem and Rob [1999] and Blum [2002] implies that subordinated debt holders are risk 
neutral. If we consider that they are risk adverse, it implies that they ask for a risk premium. In this case, the expected 
rate of return is equal to the risk free rate plus this premium. In this model, it would modify the equilibrium value of the 
level of monitoring without changing our conclusions.  
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Thus, the rate of return of subordinated debt is: 
 
(13) [ ] ( ) [ ]1(1 ) (1 )
f fIMPINF
u
R R
R
m m
α α
ρ ρ ρ ρ
= + −
− + − + ɶ
 
  
Once α ≠ 1, it reflects bank’s actual risk of default only imperfectly. The error in risk assessment is 
all the higher as the ability of subordinated debt holders to correctly assess bank’s risk and to 
incorporate it into the rate of return they ask for is low (ie α low). 
 
We aim to determine the consequences of the imperfect assessment of bank’s risk by the 
market on bank’s behaviour and on the effectiveness of supervision. First, we only consider direct 
market discipline: the bank has to hold a portion u of its liabilities into subordinated debt but the 
probability of an inspection is independent of the subordinated debt rate of return. Then, we add 
indirect market discipline by supposing that supervisors use market information to classify banks. 
 
3.1.1. Direct market discipline 
We wonder how mandatory subordinated debt affects bank’s behaviour and how the 
imperfection of bank’s risk assessment by the market can modify the risk taken by the bank. 
 
With a portion u of subordinated debt, the problem of the bank is: 
 
(14) [ ]( )max (1 ) (1 ) ( )IMPINF IMPINFH f uV m R u R uR qCC C m
m
ρ ρ= − + − − − − −  
with : [ ] ( ) [ ]1(1 ) (1 )
f fIMPINF
u
R R
R
m m
α α
ρ ρ ρ ρ
= + −
− + − + ɶ
 
 
The bank is inspected with probability q and is subject to correctives actions. We consider that these 
measures are such that when they are imposed they remove excessive risk taking. This is taken into 
account via the cost CC
IMPINF
. Without these measures, the expected cost of debt is   uαRf + (1-ρ 
+mρ)[(1-u)Rf + u(1-α) NIuR ] and is increasing with monitoring. The cost implied by corrective 
actions is fixed so that the expected cost of debt and corrective actions becomes independent of 
monitoring: 
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(15) [ ](1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )NI IMPINF NIf u f um u R u R CC u R u Rρ ρ α α − + − + − + = − + −   
 
That is : 
 
(16) (1 )((1 ) (1 ) )IMPINF NIf uCC m u R u Rρ α= − − + −  
 
The problem can be rewritten: 
 
(17) [ ] ( )max (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )((1 ) (1 ) )NI NIH f u f u C mV m R u u R u R q m u R u R
m
ρ ρ α α ρ α −= − + − − + − − + − − − + −
  
Excessive risk taking incentives still exist with probability (1-q) for the portion of debt insured (1-u) 
and the portion (1-α) of the uninsured debt. 
 
The expected value of the bank is maximized when: 
 
(18) ( ) '(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) NIH f u mR q u R u R Cρ α − − − + − =                      
 
By comparing (10) and (18), we can notice that the presence of subordinated debt leads to a greater 
level of monitoring and so a lower default probability only if: 
 
(19) 1
f
NI
u
R
R
α > −                                                              
 
Subordinated debt holders must have access to valuable and adequate information and they 
must have the ability to correctly assess bank’s risk of default and to incorporate it into the rate of 
return they require. It means, here, that α must be sufficiently high. If it is not the case, bank’s risk 
of default is increased in presence of subordinated debt. The presence of subordinated debt modifies 
bank’s choice of monitoring. Indeed, with probability α, the rate of return correctly incorporates 
bank’s risk of default, the bank has no incentives to increase its risk because it is fully reflected in 
subordinated debt rate of return. By contrast, with probability (1-α), the rate of return is 
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independent of bank’s risk and is greater than the risk free rate. Thus, by decreasing its monitoring, 
the bank increases its default probability and so decreases the probability of having to pay this 
higher rate. 
 
Depending on the information held by subordinated debt holders and their ability to use it, 
the presence of subordinated debt contributes either to limit bank’s risk of default or to increase it. 
 
3.1.2. The use of market information by supervisors 
We now consider the effects of indirect market discipline in addition to the direct 
consequences of the presence of subordinated debt on bank’s behaviour. The probability of an 
inspection depends on the rate of return of subordinated debt. Supervisors use market assessment 
about bank’s risk of defaultyto classify banks and to decide whether to early inspect a bank. They 
infer the probability of default of the bank estimated by the market from the rate of return of 
subordinated debt and they decide to early inspect a bank if its probability is greater than the 
threshold they fixed. Thus, the probability for a bank of being inspected is now a function of its 
monitoring. Indeed, we suppose that, between two on-site exams, the assessment of bank’s risk by 
the market is better than supervisors’ assessment. This hypothesis, empirically checked by Berger, 
Davies et Flannery [2000], is justified by the fact that market’s assessment is more forward looking 
and more frequent and methods used can adjust continuously contrary to the fixed methods used by 
supervisors. 
The cost of supervision errors borne when supervisors use market information is lower than 
the one obtained using only the information held by supervisors. The reason is that, with probability 
(1-α), like supervisors, subordinated debt holders does not know the actual monitoring of the bank 
but, with a probability (1-α),  they can perfectly assess it. The use of market information, even if it 
is imperfect, by limiting bank’s risk assessment errors, enables a better allocation of supervisory 
resources and limits the cost of errors. The use of this information is all the more beneficial as the 
ability of the market to correctly assess bank’s risk of default (α) is high. 
 
 
The behaviour of the bank is also affected by indirect discipline, its problem becomes: 
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(20) [ ]( ) ( )max (1 ) (1 ) IMPINF IMPINFH f u C mV m R u R uR qCC
m
ρ ρ −= − + − − − −  
with: [ ] ( )1(1 )
fIMPINF NI
u u
R
R R
m
α α
ρ ρ
= + −
− +
 
     (1 )((1 ) (1 ) )IMPINF NIf uCC m u R u Rρ α= − − + −  
      q=q( IMPINFuR ) and q'(
IMPINF
uR )>0 
  
The probability of being inspected (q) is an increasing function of subordinated debt rate of return 
which is a decreasing function of bank monitoring. 
 
The problem can be rewritten: 
 
(21) [ ] ( )max (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )((1 ) (1 ) )NI NIH f u f u C mV m R u u R u R q m u R u R
m
ρ ρ α α ρ α −= − + − − + − − + − − − + −
  
The expected value of the bank is maximized when: 
 
(22) ( ) ( )'(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )NI NIH f u m f uR q u R u R q m u R u Rρ α α − − − + − − − − + −  'mC=  
 
By using market information, supervisors make the probability of an inspection function of 
bank’s actual monitoring. Thus, comparing to the previous situation where supervisors does not use 
market information, the bank can influence its probability of being inspected: it diminishes when 
the bank increases its monitoring. This is reflected into the marginal return of monitoring. 
 
Thus, if the bank holds subordinated debt, it has incentives to increase its monitoring if 
subordinated debt holders can assess its risk with a sufficient accuracy. They exercise a direct 
market discipline which allows a decrease in bank’s default probability. By contrast, if their 
assessment of bank’s risk is not sufficiently accurate, the presence of subordinated debt leads bank 
to choose a lower level of monitoring. 
Inspection of banks by supervisors enables, in all cases, a decrease in bank’s risk of default. 
However, as they have only limited resources, they cannot inspect all banks and, due to a lack of 
information, they cannot discriminate between banks according to their default probability. They 
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make errors which are costly. If they decide to use market information included into subordinated 
debt rate of return, supervisors can reduce theirs errors and allocate their resources more efficiently. 
Besides, by using market information, they make the probability of inspection, via subordinated 
debt rate of return, dependent on the level of monitoring decided by the bank. 
 
3.2. Credibility of the absence of bail out in case of bank’s 
default 
We now consider the incentives of subordinated debt holders to exercise market discipline. 
We aim to determine how bank’s risk of default and the effectiveness of supervision vary 
depending on these incentives. We suppose that subordinated debt holders can perfectly assess 
bank’s risk of default however they perceive the possibility to receive an indemnity in case of 
bank’s default: supervisors are not credible in the limitation of insurance to depositors. The 
probability perceived by the market of a bail out in case of bank’s default is γ [ ]0,1∈ . This absence 
of credibility in the limitation of insurance can be considered in the case of large banks perceived 
by the market as too big to fail and for which a lender of last resort can intervene in case of distress. 
 
With probability γ, subordinated debt holders suppose that in case of bank’s default they will 
be compensated. Besides, they ask for an expected rate of return equal to the risk free rate. Thus, the 
expected return of subordinated debt holders is: 
 
(23) [ ]( ) (1 ) (1 )u u u fE R m R m R Rγ γρ ρ ρ γ= − + + − =  
 
And, the rate of return they require is: 
 
(24) [ ](1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )
f f
u
R R
R
m m m
γ
ρ ρ ρ γ γ ρ ρ γ
= =
− + + − − − + −
 
If the perceived probability of being compensated is equal to zero, we find [ ](1 )
f
u
R
R
m
γ
ρ ρ
=
− +
. On 
the other hand, if this probability is equal to one, which means that subordinated debt holders are 
convinced that they will be compensated if the bank defaults, the rate of return is equal to the risk 
free rate. The perception of a possible extension of the compensation to the whole creditors 
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diminishes the rate of return they ask for. The rate of return of subordinated debt reflects only 
imperfectly bank’s risk of default. 
We aim to determine the impact of the degree of supervisors’ credibility to not compensate 
subordinated debt holders on bank’s behaviour and on the effectiveness of supervision. First, we 
consider direct market discipline: banks have to hold a portion u of their liabilities into subordinated 
debt but their probability of being inspected is independent of subordinated debt rate of return. 
Then, we add indirect market discipline by supposing that supervisors use market information to 
classify banks. 
 
3.2.1. Direct market discipline 
We consider the consequences of the perception of an implicit insurance by subordinated 
debt holders on bank’s choice of monitoring. 
 
With a portion u of subordinated debt, the problem of the bank is: 
 
(25) [ ]( )max (1 ) (1 ) ( )H f u
m
V m R u R uR qCC C mγ γρ ρ= − + − − − − −   
with : 
1 (1 ) (1 )
f
u
R
R
m
γ
γ ρ ρ γ
=
− − + −
 
 
The cost of corrective actions, imposed with a probability q independent of the level of 
monitoring, is determined so that it eliminates excessive risk taking. Subordinated debt rate of 
return does not perfectly reflect the risk of the bank due to the lack of credibility of the restriction of 
insurance to depositors. We can write the rate of return uR
γ  as: 
 
(26) [ ] ( )
(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
f f
u
R R m
R
m m m m
γ γρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ γρ
−
= −
− + − + − + + −  
 
 
This rate of return is less than the one that would reflect the actual default risk of the bank, 
because of the second term which takes into account the perception of subordinated debt holders to 
 20 
be compensated in case the bank defaults. Thus, the expected cost of subordinated debt 
( ( )
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
f
f
R m
R
m m
γρ
ρ ρ γρ
−
−
− + + −  
) is an increasing function of the level of monitoring
10
. 
As corrective actions eliminate excessive risk taking, we set the cost of these measures so that the 
expected cost of debt and corrective actions is independent of bank monitoring: 
  
(27) [ ]( )(1 ) (1 ) f u fm u R uR CC Rγ γρ ρ− + − + + =  
 
That is: 
 
(28) [ ](1 )(1 ) (1 )f f uCC m u R uR m uRγ γρ ρ ρ= − − + − − +  
 
The problem of the bank can be rewritten as: 
 
(29) 
[ ] [ ]( )max (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
( )
H f f f u
m
V m R u R quR q m u R m uR
C m
γρ ρ ρ ρ ρ= − + − − − + − − − − − +
−
 
The expected value of the bank is maximized when: 
 
(30) ( ) [ ]( )' '(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )H f u u m mR q u R uR m u R Cγ γρ ρ ρ ρ− − − + + − + =  
 
The presence of subordinated debt with its holders perceiving the possibility of a compensation 
if the bank defaults, has two opposite effects on the marginal return of monitoring. Comparing with 
the case without subordinated debt: 
- It decreases because the cost of debt in case of non default is greater ((1-u)Rf + u uR
γ > Rf) 
and an increase in monitoring raises the probability of having to pay this higher cost,  
                                                 
10
 ( )
'
2
( ) 0
(1 ) (1 )
f
u m
R
E R
m m
ργ
ρ ρ γρ
  = > 
− + + −  
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- It increases because the rate of return of subordinated debt, paid  in case of non default, is a 
decreasing function of the monitoring decided by the bank ( '( ) 0u mR
γ < ). 
 
By comparing (10) and (30), we can determine when mandatory subordinated debt leads to a 
greater level of monitoring and thus to a lower probability of default. We find that the probability of 
default is lower compared to the one obtained without subordinated debt if: 
 
(31) ( ) [ ]( )'(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )f u u m fq u R uR m u R q Rγ γρ ρ ρ ρ− − + + − + < −  
 
That is: 
 
(32) [ ] '( ) (1 ) ( ) 0u f u mR R m Rγ γρ ρ ρ− + − + <  
 
Thus, the probability of default is lower when the bank holds subordinated debt if: 
 
(33) 
[ ]
[ ]
2
2
1 2 (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
m m
m
ρ ργ
ρ
− − + −
<
−
 
 
 
       The perception by subordinated debt holders of a possible compensation if the bank defaults 
must be sufficiently low so that the presence of subordinated debt leads to a decrease in the 
probability of default of the bank via direct market discipline. 
 
3.2.2. Use of market information by supervisors 
We consider the effects of indirect market discipline in addition to direct discipline: the 
probability of being inspected depends on the rate of return of subordinated debt. 
Once 0γ ≠ , the perception of a possible compensation in case of the bank defaults is 
equivalent to an overestimation of bank monitoring. Subordinated debt rate of return, which is used 
by supervisors as a signal about bank’s default risk, is: 
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(34)  [ ] [ ]ˆ(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
f f
u
R R
R
m m m
γ
ρ ρ ρ γ ρ ρ
= =
− + + − − +
 
 
The signal carried by the market overestimates the actual level of monitoring. Supervisors 
infer from uR
γ that subordinated debt holders assess a level of monitoring mˆ  : 
 
(35) ˆ (1 )m m m mγ= + − >  
 
The bias introduced in the market signal due to the lack of credibility of subordinated debt 
holders’ non insurance implies that the probability of default inferred from market information is 
always lower than the true one. Thus, it is not possible on the basis of this information to inspect a 
bank which is in reality safe. On the other hand, it is possible that the market signal leads 
supervisors not to inspect a risky bank. Errors of non inspection can be larger if supervisors use 
market information and this is all the more likely as the perception of a compensation in case of 
bank’s default (γ) is high. 
If subordinated debt holders think that they will be compensated if the bank defaults, for 
example if they perceive the bank as too big to fail, they have no incentives to assess bank’s risk of 
default and to incorporate it into the rate of return they ask for. This rate reflects only partially 
bank’s risk. Thus, the use of market information by supervisors does not always reduce errors in 
supervision. The allocation of supervisory resources is not necessarily more efficient by using 
market information. 
The problem of the bank is also affected by the use of market information, it becomes: 
 
(36) [ ]max (1 ) (1 ) (1 )((1 ) )) ( )H f u f u
m
V m R u R uR m u R uR qCC C mγ γ γρ ρ ρ= − + − − − + − − + − −  
with: 
1 (1 ) (1 )
f
u
R
R
m
γ
γ ρ ρ γ
=
− − + −
 
        [ ](1 )(1 ) (1 )f f uCC m u R uR m uRγ γρ ρ ρ= − − + − − +  
   q=q( uR
γ ) and q'( uR
γ )>0 
 
That is: 
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(37) 
[ ] [ ]( )max (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
( )
H f f f u
m
V m R u R quR q m u R m uR
C m
γρ ρ ρ ρ ρ= − + − − − + − − − − − +
−
with :   q=q( uR
γ ) and  q'( uR
γ )>0 
 
The probability of being inspected is an increasing function of the subordinated debt rate of return 
which is a decreasing function of the level of monitoring. 
 
The first order condition is: 
 
(38) 
[ ]( )
[ ]( )( )
'
' '
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
H f u u m
m f u f m
R q u R uR m u R
q u R m R m u R C
γ γ
γ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
− − − + + − +
− − − + + − − =
 
  
As the probability of being inspected is an increasing function of the subordinated debt rate 
of return, it is a decreasing function of the level of monitoring. A bank can decrease the probability 
of being inspected by increasing its monitoring. 
 
Thus, if the bank holds subordinated debt, it has incentives to increase its monitoring if 
subordinated debt holders have sufficient incentives to assess bank’s default risk; they must not 
perceive that they will be compensated if the bank defaults. In this case, they exercise direct market 
discipline which enables a decrease in the probability of default of the bank. If supervisors use the 
information contained in subordinated debt rate of return to assess bank’s risk, inspections errors of 
safe banks no longer exist but this information can also misguide them; they can decide not to 
inspect a bank which is in reality risky. This case is all the more likely that the perception of a bail 
out in case of bank’s default is high. Supervision errors are not necessarily lower when supervisors 
use market information to decide to early inspect or not a bank. However, using this information 
influences bank’s behaviour because its inspection probability depends henceforth on its 
monitoring. 
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4. Conclusion 
One of the aims of mandatory subordinated debt is to enhance both direct and indirect 
market discipline. Direct market discipline is exercised via the rate of return of these liabilities 
which depends on bank’s default risk. Indirect market discipline corresponds to the use of market 
signal by supervisors. In this model, we are between two on-site exams; supervisors cannot fully 
observe bank’s risk of default but wish to assess it in order to decide if an early inspection is 
necessary. They can, in this context, use subordinated debt rate of return as a signal. If subordinated 
debt holders are able to assess bank’s default risk and have sufficient incentives to exercise market 
discipline, mandatory subordinated debt give banks incentives to increase their monitoring and 
decrease their probability of default. Besides, if subordinated debt rate of return perfectly reflects 
bank’s risk of default, supervisors no longer make errors in banks classification, supervisory 
resources are optimally allocated. 
However, if subordinated debt holders cannot perfectly assess bank’s default risk, the 
consequences of mandatory subordinated debt are ambiguous: if indirect market discipline enables a 
decrease in supervision errors, direct effects are not clear. Holding subordinated debt allows a 
decrease in bank’s default risk only if market participants are sufficiently informed and able to 
assess it which implies that subordinated debt rate of return incorporates with sufficient accuracy 
bank’s risk of default. If it is not the case, the bank can decide to decrease its moniotoring, which 
has only a small impact on the cost of its liabilities. 
The incentives of subordinated debt holders also play a crucial role because if subordinated 
debt holders perceive strongly the possibility of a bail out if the bank fails, they do not incorporate 
bank’s default risk into the rate of return they ask for. This can lead to an increase in risk. Besides, 
if supervisors use market information as a signal about bank’s risk of default, it can in some cases 
increase classification errors and can lead to a less efficient allocation of supervisory resources. 
Thus, if mandatory subordinated debt can enable a decrease in banks’ risk exposure by 
enhancing market discipline and allow a better allocation of supervisory resources between two on-
site exams, it is necessary beforehand to make sure that the conditions needed for market discipline 
to be effective are fulfilled. Subordinated debt holders must have abilities to assess banks’ default 
risk, which implies that they have access to accurate and valuable information. The third pillar of 
Basel II by recommending increased financial transparency goes this way. However, it is also 
necessary that subordinated debt holders credibly perceive that they will not be compensated if the 
bank defaults. This implies, for example, that banks are not perceived as too big to fail. 
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Appendix: Subordinated debt holders are perfectly informed about bank’s default risk and 
have incentives to exercise market discipline. 
 
We suppose here that subordinated debt holders are perfectly able to assess bank’s default risk and 
that they have incentives to exercise market discipline as they are sure to not be compensated if the 
bank fails. Subordinated debt holders require an a-priori expected rate of return equal to the risk 
free rate of return
11
.  
Their expected return is: 
 
(39) [ ]( ) (1 ) (1 )0PIu uE R m R mρ ρ ρ= − + + −  
Where PIuR is the return obtained by subordinated debt holders if the bank does not fail. 
 
As they require E(Ru)=Rf, subordinated debt holders want to obtain a rate 
PI
uR  so that: 
 
(40) [ ](1 )
fPI
u
m
R
R
ρ ρ
=
− +
 
 
PI
uR  is an increasing function of the probability of default of the bank and a decreasing function of 
monitoring (m). 
 
The problem of the bank is: 
 
(41) [ ]( )max (1 ) (1 ) ( )PI PIH f u
m
V m R u R uR qCC C mρ ρ= − + − − − − −  
with: [ ](1 )
fPI
u
R
R
mρ ρ
=
− +
  
 
The bank is inspected with probability q, which is independent of  the level of monitoring chosen by 
the bank because supervisors cannot observe it between two on-site exams, and is subject to 
corrective actions. We suppose that when they are imposed bank’s excessive risk taking disappears. 
Without them, the expected cost of debt, uRf + (1-ρ +mρ) (1-u)Rf , increases with monitoring. The 
cost PICC  is set such as the expected cost of debt and corrective actions is independent of the 
monitoring exercised by the bank: 
  
(42) [ ](1 ) (1 ) (1 )IPf fm u R CC u Rρ ρ  − + − + = −   
 
 
                                                 
11
 Blum [2002] and Calem and Rob [1999] also consider this hypothesis. 
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Thus : 
 
(43) (1 )(1 )IP fCC m u Rρ= − −  
 
The problem of the bank can be rewritten: 
 
(44) [ ]max (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ( )H f f
m
V m R R q m u R C mρ ρ ρ= − + − + − − − −   
  
The expected value of the bank is maximized when: 
 
(45) ( ) '(1 )(1 )H f mR q u R Cρ − − − =  
 
Thus, we can notice, by comparing with equation (10) (fully insured debt and bank supervision) that 
the presence of subordinated debt enables an increase in the level of monitoring chosen by the bank 
and diminishes its default probability. Indeed, subordinated debt rate of return is a function of 
bank’s default risk: for a portion u of debt, the bank has no incentives to decrease its monitoring 
because an increase in default risk is fully reflected into the rate of return IPuR . In contrast to insured 
debt, the expected cost of this debt is not a increasing function of monitoring but is independent of 
it ( [ ]( ) (1 ) IPu u fE R m R Rρ ρ= − + = ). The greater is the portion u of subordinated debt, the closer we 
are from the socially optimal level of monitoring
12
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Here, if u=1, we obtain the socially optimal situation. In reality, we can suppose that there are social costs when a 
bank fails which are taken into account by supervisors but not by the market which considers only private costs. In this 
case, even if the debt was fully constituted of subordinated debt, bank’s monitoring would be less than the socially 
optimal level which indicates that market discipline cannot replace banking supervision. To simplify, here these private 
costs are not considered. 
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